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COPYRIGHT, DEATH, AND TAXES
Edward Lee

The Copyright Act of 1976 is nearing its fourth decade of
existence.1 By historical standards, that longevity puts the 1976 Act
“on the clock” for a major revision in the near future. Indeed, given
the incredible advances in digital technologies and the Internet—all
of which were unforeseen by Congress back in 1976—the need for a
major revision and modernization of copyright law may already be
upon us.2
This time around, however, Congress faces a challenge it has
never faced before. In none of the five previous copyright acts did
Congress have international treaty obligations effectively limiting
the alternatives available for reform.3 The Berne Convention and
the TRIPS Agreement—which the United States joined in 1989 and
2004, respectively—set forth numerous minimum standards of
copyright law and restrict the scope of permissible copyright
exceptions.4 Although these agreements do allow some flexibility for
 Professor of Law, Director, Program in Intellectual Property Law, IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law, Norman and Edna Freehling Scholar. Many
thanks to Jonathan Band, Evelyn Brody, Stephanie Hoffer, and Thomas
Shinnick for comments on earlier drafts, and to the participants of the
Intellectual Property Scholars Conference 2011 and faculty workshops at
Chicago-Kent College of Law and Marquette University Law School. I benefited
from conversations with Kathleen Courtney regarding state tax incentives in
film production, David Jakopin regarding tax and IP, Bruce Nash regarding
Hollywood accounting, and Pamela Samuelson regarding copyright reform.
Michael Johnson and James Baldwin provided excellent research assistance.
Tom Gaylord and Claire Alfus provided invaluable help in, respectively,
tracking down sources and creating the tables.
1. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
2. See Pamela Samuelson, Preliminary Thoughts on Copyright Reform,
2007 UTAH L. REV. 551, 553–54.
3. See infra notes 75–86 and accompanying text. The United States joined
the Universal Copyright Convention (“UCC”) in 1955, but the UCC
accommodated the former U.S. approach to copyright (with formalities) and
lacked an enforcement mechanism to stop violations. See Universal Copyright
Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, revised July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 943 U.N.T.S.
178; Robert S. Chaloupka, International Aspects of Copyright Law, 15 INT’L HR
J. 18, 18–19 (2006); Tyler Ochoa, Protection for Works of Foreign Origin Under
the 1909 Copyright Act, 26 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 285, 299–
300 (2010).
4. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
Sept. 9, 1886, revised July 24, 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 18338 [hereinafter Berne
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countries to shape their own copyright laws in some respects, in
other areas the requirements are more fixed.5 A number of basic
features of copyright law—a set of required exclusive rights
including rights for derivative works, a ban on formalities for foreign
works, and a term that lasts at least the life of the author plus fifty
years—are now all set in Berne stone.6 TRIPS adds to the
calcification of copyright by imposing additional requirements on
countries.7
Of course, one way of dealing with the international copyright
treaties would be to modernize them as well. Indeed, some of the
provisions of the Berne Convention, which date back to the early
1900s, if not earlier, may need modernizing more than the U.S.
Amending international copyright treaties,
Copyright Act.8

Convention]; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights arts. 9–14, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197–1226, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299,
304–17 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
The TRIPS Agreement
incorporates Articles 1 through 21 and the Appendix thereto of the Berne
Convention, thereby including them within the scope of WTO enforcement
proceedings. See TRIPS Agreement, supra, art. 9(1).
5. Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles’ Heel, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 479,
483–84, 492 (2010) (“[M]ore than two-thirds of the provisions [in TRIPS] sought
to introduce, in a single undertaking, new substantive minimum standards on
which there was no prior international consensus.”). See generally GRAEME B.
DINWOODIE & ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS, A NEOFEDERALIST VISION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME: THE RESILIENCE OF THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT TO TECHNOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE (forthcoming Mar. 2012)
(arguing that TRIPS is best understood as allowing considerable flexibility for
member countries to meet minimum standards); Edward Lee, The Global Trade
Mark (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author) (discussing extent to
which TRIPS allows varied approaches among members).
6. See Berne Convention, supra note 4, arts. 1–18, (setting forth minimum
standards of copyright).
7. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 9–14.
8. For example, the ban against formalities in Berne Article 5(2) dates
back to 1908. See DANIEL CHOW & EDWARD LEE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 96–97 (2006). Some scholars question the continuing abidance to this
early twentieth century rule, which makes it difficult to identify and locate
copyright owners. See Stef van Gompel, Formalities in the Digital Era: An
Obstacle or Opportunity? in GLOBAL COPYRIGHT: THREE HUNDRED YEARS SINCE
THE STATUTE OF ANNE, FROM 1709 TO CYBERSPACE 395, 395–98 (Lionel Bently et
al. eds., 2010); see also STEF VAN GOMPEL, FORMALITIES IN COPYRIGHT LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF THEIR HISTORY, RATIONALES AND POSSIBLE FUTURE 15–51 (2011)
(discussing how formalities function in intellectual property systems).
Likewise, the rule of the shorter term in Article 7(8) requires countries to give,
absent legislation to the contrary, foreign works a shorter term of copyright as
set by their country of origin instead of the longer term granted to domestic
works. Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 7(8). This provision, which also
dates back to 1908, was adopted to create a transition and an incentive for
newly joining countries that had shorter terms to raise their terms to the
minimum standard of the life of the author plus fifty years. See CHOW & LEE,
supra, at 218. Because all Berne countries are now required to have a term of
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however, requires agreement by a consensus or the unanimity of
Getting consensus among World Trade
member countries.9
Organization (“WTO”) countries about a major copyright revision—
such as abandoning some of the outdated Berne features—would be
difficult, to say the least. No doubt it would be more difficult than
getting a simple majority of Congress to enact a revision of U.S.
copyright law.
Thus, at least in the short-term, Congress may be better off
exploring options for reforming copyright law within the current
TRIPS/Berne framework, while working in the long-term with the
Executive Branch and U.S. Trade Representative to modernize
international IP agreements. That way, the United States can begin
to modernize its copyright law instead of waiting for consensus
among WTO and Berne countries on copyright reform.
The
downside, however, is that many U.S. reform proposals may face the
same stumbling block: the Berne Convention and TRIPS Agreement
may restrict, if not preclude, many copyright reforms in domestic
law. “Can’t do it because it’s a Berne violation” has become an alltoo-common refrain to torpedo numerous ideas for improving or
modernizing our copyright system.10 Because of these international
requirements, the ability of WTO countries to enact new, innovative
approaches to copyright law is circumscribed.
To deal with this problem, this Article offers a new alternative
for copyright reform: tax law. I call this approach the “tax fix” for
copyright law, in that tax law is used to fix problems or inefficiencies
in our copyright system. Using the tax system as a way to
modernize our copyright system offers several advantages. Most
important, tax law can fix problems in our copyright system without

at least the life of the author plus fifty years, the original reason for the rule of
the shorter term is no longer relevant. Yet, a negative effect of the rule is that
it puts pressure on all member countries to raise their copyright terms to
whatever is the longest term recognized by any member; otherwise, the other
countries’ citizens might be disadvantaged with a shorter term in the country
that has a longer term. See id. at 219.
9. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
art. X, ¶ 8, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1144, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 (1994) (declaring
that a consensus of members is required for amendment to TRIPS Agreement);
Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 27(3) (declaring that “any revision of this
Act . . . shall require unanimity of the votes cast”).
10. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, The U.S. Experience with Mandatory
Copyright Formalities: A Love/Hate Relationship, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 311,
345 (2010); Ruth L. Okediji, The Regulation of Creativity Under the WIPO
Internet Treaties, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2379, 2391 (2009); Aryeh L. Pomerantz,
Obtaining Copyright Licenses by Prescriptive Easement: A Solution to the
Orphan Works Problem, 50 JURIMETRICS J. 195, 203–04 (2010); R. Anthony
Reese, Photographs of Public Domain Paintings: How, If At All, Should We
Protect Them?, 34 J. CORP. L. 1033, 1052–53 (2009); Christina M. Costanzo,
Comment, Have Orphan Works Found a Home in Class Action Settlements?, 83
TEMP. L. REV. 569, 586–87 (2011).
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violating the Berne Convention or TRIPS Agreement, and without
requiring amendment to either treaty. Tax law can also be used to
incentivize the copyright industries to adopt new, innovative
approaches to copyright in ways that voluntary reforms like
Creative Commons cannot. The tax fix has the added benefit of
offering, beyond the “one size fits all” approach, greater tailoring of
copyrights by both industries and individuals—which may, in turn,
lead to greater efficiency.
Part I discusses the need for a major revision of copyright law in
the twenty-first century.
Past historical practice and new
technological changes both suggest a major revision of copyright law
is due.
Yet two major obstacles—political stalemate and
international treaty obligations—dim the prospect for achieving the
necessary modernization of copyright law.
Part II introduces the concept of the tax fix for copyright law
and shows its possible advantages. Tax is one method that is given
a great deal of consideration in other areas where incentives are
important, but, surprisingly, is discussed hardly at all in copyright
law. The tax fix is not a panacea for the inefficiencies and
obsolescence in our copyright system. Nor is it meant as the sole
method of modernizing copyright law. Instead, the tax fix is offered
as another possible tool in the toolbox of options for Congress to
modernize the copyright system.
Part III explains how the tax fix can address inefficiencies
within our copyright system. Two types of tax fixes are offered: (1) a
“copyright gains” tax, which establishes a preferential tax rate for
income derived from certain socially beneficial initiatives related to
copyrighted works, and (2) a copyright tax credit that grants a credit
for such initiatives. For illustrative purposes, this Article shows
how tax law can be used to reduce the problem and inefficiencies
created by orphan works and the lack of copyright registration,
lengthy copyright terms, and the lack of clear copyright exemptions.
It also illustrates how tax law can be used to help address the
problem of spiraling costs of textbooks in schools. Although the
solutions offered by the tax fix are not perfect, they are second-best
alternatives that may give Congress a more flexible way to address
some of the inefficiencies of our copyright system, without requiring
any change in our international treaty obligations.
Part IV
addresses possible concerns.
I. THE COPYRIGHT PARADOX: MODERNIZING COPYRIGHT
LAW IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
This Part discusses the paradox copyright law faces today: a
major revision to the Copyright Act of 1976 is needed more than
ever, but it is even harder to achieve such reform today. This
paradox will plague Congress’s efforts to enact a major copyright
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revision that can deal with the advances in technology of the
twenty-first century.
A.

Need for Copyright Reform
1.

Historical Practice: The Forty-Year Cycle of Revision

If historical practice is a guide,11 then the U.S. copyright system
is due for a general revision or major updating. The Copyright Act
has undergone general revisions roughly every forty years,12 which
means that the next revision should be made by 2016.
The pattern of revision is rather striking. The 1790 Act, the
first copyright act in the United States,13 was replaced by the 1831
Act.14 The 1831 Act was replaced by the 1870 Act,15 which was later
replaced by the 1909 Act.16 Finally, the 1909 Act was replaced by
the current 1976 Act.17 Although the 1976 Act took longer than
forty years from its predecessor to enact, Congress began studies for
copyright reform overseen by the Copyright Office starting in 1955,
or forty-six years from the enactment of the 1909 Act.18 (In between
and after these major revisions, other amendments were enacted to
the then-existing Act.)
In each revision, Congress attempted to modernize copyright
law to address the changing time period and new types of works and
technologies. From its inception, copyright law has struggled to
keep pace with the advances in technology—for example, the
printing press, pianola, camera, radio, film, television, VCR,
computer, and now the Internet, digital technologies, and social
media. The history of copyright suggests that Congress should
begin to study whether a general revision or major updating of the
Copyright Act is needed for the twenty-first century. The last
general revision occurred more than thirty-five years ago, long
before the incredible advances brought on by the Internet. As
11. Cf. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 200 (2003) (“To comprehend the
scope of Congress’ power under the Copyright Clause, ‘a page of history is worth
a volume of logic.’” (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349
(1921))).
12. See Samuelson, supra note 2, at 556.
13. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831) [hereinafter
1790 Act].
14. See Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (repealed 1870) [hereinafter
1831 Act].
15. See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (repealed 1909)
[hereinafter 1870 Act].
16. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976)
[hereinafter 1909 Act].
17. See Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (effective
Jan. 1, 1978) [hereinafter 1976 Act].
18. See Legislative Appropriations Act of 1955, ch. 568, 69 Stat. 499;
Howard B. Abrams, Copyright’s First Compulsory License, 26 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 215, 221 n.33 (2010).
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Pamela Samuelson encapsulates, “the 1976 Act was passed with a
1950s/60s mentality built into it, just at a time when computer and
communication technology advances were about to raise the most
challenging and vexing copyright questions ever encountered.”19
2. Inefficiencies of the Copyright System in the Twenty-First
Century
The forty-year lifespan of previous copyright acts tells only half
the story. The more important reason a copyright revision is needed
is that the current 1976 Act is showing its age.20 It has produced
glaring inefficiencies, which have become more pronounced in our
digital age.
a. Notice Externalities and Orphan Works
One clear deficiency is the creation of a copyright system that
grants relatively long terms of copyright for all works—for
individuals, the life of the author plus seventy years—while
allowing those works to go unregistered, meaning there is no public
record or registry identifying titles or owners of most copyrighted
works.21 Currently, copyright registration is required in the United
States only to bring a copyright infringement lawsuit for works
originating in the United States.22 Foreign works are not subject to
this requirement because the Berne Convention prohibits the use of
formalities by member countries in such instance.23 Copyright
registration in the United States also entitles the copyright owner to
elect possible statutory damages in lieu of actual damages and
attorneys’ fees in successful litigation.24 However, because so few
copyright lawsuits are ever brought,25 the incentives for registration
of U.S. works are modest and are probably more relevant to the
major U.S. copyright industries, such as publishing, music, and
movies.
The lack of an effective registration system for copyrighted
works produces substantial “notice externalities,” to borrow a term

19. Samuelson, supra note 2, at 555.
20. See Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (2010)
(“The statute was not well-designed to withstand change, and has aged badly.”).
21. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302–04, 408 (2006). For U.S. works, registration is a
requirement to bring an infringement lawsuit, but relatively few copyright
lawsuits are brought each year. See Edward Lee, Warming Up to UserGenerated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1459, 1476–77 (stating that in 2006,
only 4944 copyright suits were filed, with most not ever going to trial).
22. See 17 U.S.C. § 411 (2006).
23. See Berne Convention, supra note 4, art 5(2).
24. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 504–05.
25. See Lee, supra note 21, at 1476–77 (stating that just roughly 5000 suits
were filed in 2006).
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coined by Peter Menell and Michael Meurer.26 These notice
externalities impose huge external costs on the ability of the public
to use and license copyrighted works. Put simply, for many works,
there is no way for the public to figure out who owns the copyright.
This combination of lengthy terms and lack of registration
contributes to the so-called “orphan works” problem, meaning it is
practically impossible for people to locate or identify the copyright
holder of many copyrighted works, especially those published
decades ago, in order to seek permission to use the works.27 Without
registration or registry of owners, the works have become effectively
“orphaned.” And, because copyright law still protects these orphan
works, people who wish to utilize the works cannot do so out of fear
of being sued.28
A major reason for the orphan works problem is the lack of an
effective copyright registration system—which is ironic with all the
modern technology and vast databases we have.
Even with
wondrous technologies at our disposal, our copyright system is stuck
in the 1908 Berne Convention world of no formalities.29 In other
areas of property, such as title to land, ownership of a patent, or
trademark registration, a public registry facilitates transactions
related to a property in the registry by enabling the public to locate
the relevant owner.30 Because our copyright system lacks a
comprehensive database of works under copyright,31 the public may
have no practicable way of locating the relevant owner of a work,
particularly if the work was created long ago, such as in the 1920s
or 1930s.
Empirical studies have identified an alarming number of
orphan works both here and abroad. In response to the U.S.
Copyright Office study, Carnegie Mellon University (“CMU”)
conducted a three-year survey of its own collection.
CMU
determined that copyright owners could not be located for 22% of the
books in its survey.32 The percentage of orphan works jumped to
26. See Peter S. Menell & Michael Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice
Externalities (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper No. 11-58, 2011), available
at
http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/documents
/MenellP-MeurerM121611.pdf.
27. See Joshua O. Mausner, Copyright Orphan Works: A Multi-Pronged
Solution to Solve a Harmful Market Inefficiency, 12 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 395, 398
(2007).
28. See id.
29. See Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 5(2).
30. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable
Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 477 (2003) (“Equally immense tracing costs
would be required to determine the ownership of a parcel of land if titles to land
were not recorded in a public registry. It is not perpetual property rights but
the absence of registration that creates prohibitive tracing costs.”).
31. See Mausner, supra note 27, at 412.
32. See Letter from Denise Troll Covey, Principal Librarian for Special
Projects, Carnegie Mellon Univ., to Jule L. Sigall, Assoc. Register for Policy &
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over 60% for older works published in the 1920s.33 Moreover, even
when copyright owners were identified, 36% of them did not reply at
all to CMU’s multiple letters.34 Cornell University Library faced
similar problems and could not locate the copyright owners of 58% of
343 copyrighted monographs in its collection, while spending over
$50,000 in staff time dealing with copyright issues.35 The Library of
Congress estimated in 1993 that 80% of films created before 1929
were orphan works and were at risk of deterioration due to the
inability to get permission to preserve the films.36 A study in the
United Kingdom estimated that UK museums, galleries, and
archives may have over 50 million orphan works.37 According to a
British Library estimate, 40% of all printed works are orphan
works, and more than 50% of sound recordings surveyed in its
collection are orphan works.38
Congress is well aware of the orphan works problem, but,
unfortunately, has failed to address it. In 2006, after a year of
studying the issue, the Copyright Office issued its Report on Orphan
Works, which recommended that Congress enact a copyright
provision to allow good faith users to use an orphan work without a
license if they could not find the copyright holder of the orphan work
after a reasonably diligent search.39 If the copyright holder later
appeared, the user would have to pay reasonable compensation to
the copyright holder for use of the work.40 Both the House and

Int’l Affairs, U.S. Copyright Office (Mar. 22, 2005) (on file with Carnegie Mellon
Univ. Libraries), available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments
/OW0537-CarnegieMellon.pdf.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See Letter from Sarah E. Thomas, Carl A. Kroch Univ. Librarian,
Cornell Univ. Library, to Jule L. Sigall, Assoc. Register for Policy & Int’l
Affairs,
U.S.
Copyright
Office
(Mar.
23,
2005),
available
at
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0569-Thomas.pdf.
36. See LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS, REPORT ON FILM PRESERVATION 1993: A
STUDY OF THE CURRENT STATE OF AMERICAN FILM PRESERVATION 5 (1993).
37. See JISC, IN FROM THE COLD: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SCOPE OF “ORPHAN
WORKS” AND ITS IMPACT ON THE DELIVERY OF SERVICES TO THE PUBLIC 18 (2009),
available at http://www.jisc.ac.uk/publications/reports/2009/infromthecold.aspx;
see also Katharina de la Durantaye, Finding a Home for Orphans: Google Book
Search and Orphan Works Law in the United States and Europe, 21 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 229, 236–37 (2011) (discussing the results of
various studies).
38. See GOWERS REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 69 (2006), available at
www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/other/0118404830/0118404830.pdf
[hereinafter GOWERS REVIEW]; THE BRITISH LIBRARY MANIFESTO, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: A BALANCE 3 (2006), available at http://www.cpic.ru/news/IP
_Manifesto_final.pdf.
39. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS 95 (2006)
[hereinafter ORPHAN WORKS REPORT], available at http://www.copyright.gov
/orphan/orphan-report.pdf.
40. See id. at 96.
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Senate held hearings, and several bills modeled in part on the
Copyright Office proposal were entertained.41 However, Congress
has yet to put any of the bills to a full vote.42 Congress’s inaction on
the orphan works problem even appeared to draw thinly veiled
criticism from the Department of Justice in its objection to the
proposed settlement of the Google Book Search case, in which the
private parties attempted to solve the orphan works problem on
their own by setting up a Book Rights Registry.43
b. Obsolescence in an Age of Digital Technologies
Another deficiency is the 1976 Act’s construction based on a
model of printing and analog technologies—a framework that
translates poorly with today’s digital technologies, which routinely
make copies of works by their operation.44 Not surprisingly, the two
most substantial studies on copyright reform to date—Samuelson’s
Copyright Principles Project in the United States and Ian
Hargreaves’s Review in the United Kingdom—both identified the
advances in digital technologies as a major reason why reform of
copyright laws is needed today.45
By their design, digital technologies produce digital copies of
material incidental to their operation. For example, a digital copy of
a computer’s operating system is created in random-access memory
(“RAM”) every time a person turns on the computer.46 Whenever a
person views a website, a copy is downloaded onto the computer’s

41. See Orphan Works Act of 2008, H.R. 5889, 110th Cong. (2008); Shawn
Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008, S. 2913, 110th Cong. (2008); see also The
“Orphan Works” Problem and Proposed Legislation: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Committee
of the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 131 (2008).
42. See Betsy McKenzie, Orphan Works, OUT OF THE JUNGLE (Apr. 18, 2011,
9:40 AM), http://outofthejungle.blogspot.com/2011/04/orphan-works.html.
43. See Statement of Interest of the United States of America Regarding
Proposed Class Action Settlement, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 05 CV
8136-DC (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2009), at 3 (“In particular, the rediscovery of
currently unused or inaccessible works and the digitization of those works in
formats that are accessible to persons with disabilities are important public
policy goals. The United States believes that, although the actions of private
entities and Congress (if necessary), steps should be taken to advance these
objectives.”), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f250100/250180.pdf.
44. See Samuelson, supra note 2, at 554–55.
45. See IAN HARGREAVES, DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY: A REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 3 (2011) [hereinafter HARGREAVES REVIEW] available at
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipreview-finalreport.pdf; PAMELA SAMUELSON & MEMBERS
OF THE CPP, THE COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES PROJECT: DIRECTIONS FOR REFORM 2–3,
18–19 (2010) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES PROJECT], available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/bclt_CPP.pdf.
46. See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th
Cir. 1993).
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RAM and cache or temporary Internet folder.47 In order to access
the website, copies of the webpage are transmitted internally
through the Internet and an Internet service provider’s lines.48
When a person uses Google or another search engine to find a
website, the ability to find the website was created by the search
engine’s ability to create an index of websites with digital copies
stored on the search engine’s servers.49 The 1976 Act does not
directly address the legality of any of these digital copies but,
instead, relegates them to potential infringement claims as a
violation of the right to copy.50 Courts have struggled to make sense
of when the use of digital copies (including ones internal to a
machine) should be considered infringing or permissible fair use.51
This lack of clarity in the law can chill investment in and
development of new digital technologies.52
Even when Congress has enacted updates to the 1976 Act to
address digital technologies, the results have not been reassuring.
The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995
(“DPRA”) is, put charitably, a complete failure in legislative
drafting. As David Nimmer put it, “[T]his amendment was by far
the worst thing that had happened to date to copyright law. . . . The
DPRA is a masterpiece of incoherence.”53 DPRA recognized a right
of digital public performance for sound recordings (relevant to
webcasting of music) and amended § 114 to define limitations of that
right.54 Yet the provisions defining those limitations are, to borrow
the then-Register of Copyrights Marybeth Peters’s assessment,
“utterly incomprehensible to most people.”55

47. See John S. Sieman, Comment, Using the Implied License to Inject
Common Sense Into Digital Copyright, 85 N.C. L. REV. 885, 891 (2007).
48. See Hannibal Travis, Opting Out of the Internet in the United States
and the European Union: Copyright, Safe Harbors, and International Law, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 331, 362–63 (2008).
49. See Sieman, supra note 47, at 889–91.
50. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). In 1998, Congress created the DMCA safe
harbors for ISPs for certain activities of providing Internet access, caching,
storage, and location tools. See id. § 512.
51. See Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 139 (2d
Cir. 2008); CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir. 2004);
MAI Sys., 991 F.2d at 522–23 (RAM copies infringing); see also Edward Lee,
Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 801–02 (2010).
52. See HARGREAVES REVIEW, supra note 45, at 3 (“Digital communications
technology involves routine copying of text, images and data, meaning that
copyright law has started to act as a regulatory barrier to the creation of certain
kinds of new, internet based businesses.”).
53. David Nimmer, Codifying Copyright Comprehensibly, 51 UCLA L. REV.
1233, 1336 (2004).
54. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(6), 114(d) (2006).
55. See Ralph Oman, Going Back to First Principles: The Exclusive Rights
of Authors Reborn, 8 J. HIGH TECH. L. 169, 173 (2008).
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The safe harbors afforded to Internet service providers (“ISPs”)
under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (“DMCA”) have
done a better job of modernizing copyright law. The DMCA safe
harbors provide ISPs immunity from copyright liability if they meet
certain requirements, such as complying with the “notice-andtakedown” requirement for allegedly infringing material stored by
their users on their servers.56 The notice-and-takedown procedure—
although not without its abuses and deficiencies57—has provided a
decent way to divide the burdens of monitoring possible copyright
infringement online.58 Yet, even with their successes, the DMCA
safe harbors have not kept up with advances in technology. Drafted
in 1998, the DMCA safe harbors did not anticipate social media and
Web 2.0 technologies that encourage user sharing of and
interactivity with material on the Internet.59 The billion-dollar
lawsuit against YouTube, now on appeal, is a byproduct of the lack
of clarity in the DMCA safe harbors’ application to new
technologies.60
The many complex issues of copyright law raised by digital
technologies demand a more comprehensive and coherent approach.
In 1976, Congress did not have the opportunity to devise a copyright
system specifically for our digital age.61 In the next copyright
revision, Congress will have that chance.
c. “One Size Fits All” Approach
One of the lessons to draw from these examples is that
copyright law must become more adept and flexible. It must be
revised and modernized to address the glaring, chronic inefficiencies
in the copyright system, such as the orphan works problem and

56. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
57. See Wendy Seltzer, Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright’s Safe Harbor:
Chilling Effects of the DMCA on the First Amendment, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
171, 176 (2010) (criticizing DMCA safe harbor process as chilling speech and
raising First Amendment concerns); Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter,
Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”? Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 621, 684 (2006) (discussing a study showing copyright holders file
questionable takedown notices in 22.5% of DMCA notices surveyed).
58. See Edward Lee, Decoding the DMCA Safe Harbors, 32 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 233, 252–55, 259–60 (2009). Several countries have adopted similar
approaches to ISP safe harbors requiring a notice-and-takedown process. See
Broder Kleinschmidt, An International Comparison of ISP’s Liabilities for
Unlawful Third Party Content, 18 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 332, 337–53 (2010)
(discussing approaches in the United States, European Union, Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand).
59. See Brandon Brown, Fortifying the Safe Harbors: Reevaluating the
DMCA in a Web 2.0 World, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 437, 437 (2008).
60. Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 516, 518–19,
526–27 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); see also Lee, supra note 58, at 258–59.
61. See Samuelson, supra note 2, at 551–54.

W03_LEE

12

4/2/2012 11:39 AM

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

huge notice externalities. It also must transform its monolithic
approach to copyright into a more nimble approach that helps to
foster innovation in both content production and technologies.62
A growing body of research indicates that applying a monolithic
or “one size fits all” approach to copyright for all works is inefficient,
in that the social benefit of many works is not ever realized.63 The
orphan works problem provides one good example—granting all
works the same long term of copyright protection leads to underutilization of the works because some owners abandon them but are
still protected by copyrights for their works. By some estimates,
only two percent of all copyrighted works are commercially
exploited,64 yet the Copyright Act grants all works copyrights as if
they all will be commercially exploited for generations. Another
example of inefficiencies in our copyright system is the application
of the long term of copyright (ninety-five years) to computer
software, given the short shelf life of software.65
B.

Obstacles to U.S. Copyright Law Revisions

Although a revision of the Copyright Act is needed to modernize
copyright law, two major roadblocks stand in its way: (1) politics,
and (2) international treaties.
1.

Political Stalemate in Congress

Copyright issues have become intensely politicized and
polarized in the United States.66 Copyright industries disagree with
ISPs over the scope of liability or safe harbor protection for ISPs for
infringing activity conducted by their users. Copyright holders want
more liability and duties imposed on ISPs, while ISPs want greater

62. See generally Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87,
102–05 (2004) (discussing regulatory copyright and its affect on industries);
Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 279
(2004) (“[T]he main challenges for twenty first century copyright are not
challenges of authorship policy, but rather new and harder problems for
copyright’s communications policy: copyright’s poorly understood role in
regulating competition among rival disseminators.”).
63. See, e.g., THE STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CAN ONE
SIZE FIT ALL? (Annette Kur & Vytautas Mizaras eds., 2011) (collecting fourteen
articles on intellectual property law); Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit
All: A Framework for Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J.
1361, 1389–90 (2009).
64. See GOWERS REVIEW, supra note 38, at 69.
65. See Bruce Abramson, Promoting Innovation in the Software Industry: A
First Principles Approach to Intellectual Property Reform, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH.
L. 75, 135 (2002).
66. See Jessica Litman, The Politics of Intellectual Property, 27 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 313, 317 (2009); COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES PROJECT, supra note
45, at 4.
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protection afforded to them by the safe harbors.67 Moreover,
copyright industries typically want a broader scope and duration of
copyrights and stronger enforcement provisions against infringers.68
However, public interest groups representing libraries, educators,
and users typically seek a narrower scope of copyright and a greater
recognition of exemptions or activities as fair use.69 The debates
over copyright—too often called a “war”—have sometimes
degenerated into name-calling and vitriol, even resulting in threats
of bodily harm.70
Disagreement among copyright stakeholders translates into
political stalemate in Congress because copyright legislation is
drafted by lobbyists employed by the stakeholders, not by members
of Congress or their staff.71 Under this culture in which copyright
lobbyists control the shape and even the language of copyright bills,
the passage of a bill may depend more on getting lobbyists to agree
than on the actual merits of the bill.
The Copyright Act of 1976 took decades of study, hearings, and
debate before Congress eventually reached an agreement.72 The
agreement was, in part, facilitated by the Copyright Office’s
oversight in conducting meetings with and brokering compromise
among various stakeholders.73 In today’s even more polarized
environment, one can only imagine how long it might take to reach a
compromise among stakeholders on major issues needed for reform.
At the 2011 Annual Meeting of the Copyright Society of the U.S.A.,
former Register of Copyrights Marybeth Peters applauded the
discussion of reforms to the Copyright Act, but soberly admitted that
we are “not ready” to undertake such reforms.74
2.

International Obligations Under Berne/TRIPS

Even if politics were not a major obstacle to copyright reform,
international treaties pose hurdles of their own. The United States

67. See Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 337
(2002); COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES PROJECT, supra note 45, at 20.
68. See Litman, supra note 67.
69. See Laura N. Gasaway, Impasse: Distance Learning and Copyright, 62
OHIO ST. L.J. 783, 810–14 (2001); Litman, supra note 66, at 315.
70. See WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 11–14
(2009); Litman, supra note 66, at 315.
71. See Litman, supra note 66, at 314.
72. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 743 (1989)
(stating that the 1976 Copyright Act, “which almost completely revised existing
copyright law, was the product of two decades of negotiation by representatives
of creators and copyright-using industries, supervised by the Copyright Office
and, to a lesser extent, by Congress”).
73. Id.
74. Marybeth Peters, Statement at Annual Meeting, Copyright Society of
the USA, Panel on “To Reform or Not to Reform: That Is the Question” (June
10, 2011).
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is a member of the Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement,
both of which establish “minimum standards” or requirements for
copyright law.75 TRIPS incorporates Articles 1 through 21 and the
Appendix of the Berne Convention, so there is overlap between the
two.76
Given the minimum standards required by Berne and TRIPS,
copyright reform in the United States cannot be written on a blank
slate.
Reforms must consider how a country’s international
obligations will be satisfied, or the country may risk a challenge to
its law before the WTO. The minimum standards of Berne apply
only to foreign works (i.e., how each country treats works from
foreign countries), meaning each country has discretion to use a
different approach for its own domestic works.77 More often than
not, however, countries adopt a single approach under copyright law
for both domestic and foreign works.78
So how do Berne and TRIPS limit the field of options for
revising or modernizing copyright law? They limit the field by
codifying a particular model of copyright—what rights it entails,
how long it should last, and what exceptions can be allowed. These
so-called “minimum standards” of copyright allow some flexibility,
but typically do not allow a dramatic departure from the conception
of copyright the treaties envision.
For example, several of the minimum standards of Berne, which
are also incorporated into TRIPS, present obstacles for recent
proposals for copyright reform. In the debate over orphan works,
some proposals seek to require registration of copyrighted works in
order to create a public record of copyright owners, so that would-be
licensees can seek permission from the copyright owner of a work.79
Article 5(2) of Berne, however, prohibits “any formality,” such as
registration, being imposed as a condition on “[t]he enjoyment and
exercise of” copyright for foreign works.80 To avoid this prohibition,
Chris Sprigman proposes that unregistered works be subject to a
“‘default’ license that allows [third-party] use [of the unregistered

75. See ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS & ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 218–20 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 2d ed. 2004).
76. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 9. The key practical difference
between the two is that TRIPS is subject to enforcement proceedings under the
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body, whereas the Berne Convention has no
comparable enforcement body. See Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, WORLD
TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last
visited Feb. 10, 2012).
77. See Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 5(3) (“Protection in the country
of origin is governed by domestic law.”).
78. See CHOW & LEE, supra note 8, at 95–96.
79. See, e.g., Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 485, 552, 555 (2004).
80. Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 5(2).
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works] for a predetermined fee.”81 It is at least debatable whether
Sprigman’s proposal violates Berne (or Article 13 of the TRIPS
Agreement, which limits copyright exceptions82).
Likewise, in the debate over copyright terms, some proposals
seek to shorten the term of copyright so that works that are not
commercially exploited will enter the public domain sooner.83
Article 7(1) of Berne, however, requires a minimum term of the life
of the author plus fifty years for foreign works.84 Unless Congress
wanted to create shorter terms only for U.S. works, the proposal to
reduce the copyright term below the Berne minimum standard is
not a viable option. Moreover, even if Congress adopted shorter
terms only for U.S. works, thus complying with Berne Article 7(1),
such an amendment could disadvantage U.S. authors abroad.
Article 7(8), also known as the “rule of the shorter term,” creates a
default approach requiring, absent legislation to the contrary, that
countries give foreign works a shorter term from their country of
origin rather than a longer term that applies to domestic works.85
The rule of the shorter term thus puts pressure on countries to
increase their copyright terms to whatever is the longest term of
copyright recognized by a Berne country, in order to avoid having
their citizens’ works subjected to a shorter term in the longest-term
country in Berne. The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of
1998 (which extended the term of U.S. copyrights to life plus seventy
years to match the European Union’s term) was justified precisely
on this ground.86
In short, given the minimum standards of copyright under
Berne and TRIPS, member countries do not have complete freedom
to alter dramatically their copyright laws—at least not without
potentially violating international treaty obligations. The challenge
for Congress is to figure out a way to modernize U.S. copyright law
within the constraints set by these international agreements, or to
have those agreements changed as well.
II. THE TAX FIX FOR COPYRIGHT LAW
This Part lays out the theory for using the Tax Code to achieve
copyright reforms and objectives. Surprisingly, tax law has been
underutilized in promoting the goals of copyright. This Part
explains why Congress should consider using tax incentives to
further copyright objectives and reform.
81. Sprigman, supra note 79, at 555.
82. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 13.
83. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
287–93 (2004).
84. Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 7(1).
85. Id. art. 7(8).
86. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205–06 (2003).
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Using the Tax Code to Achieve Non-Tax Goals

Historically, Congress has used the Tax Code to achieve a
variety of “non-tax” goals, meaning substantive policy goals outside
of taxation.87 Indeed, the Tax Code is littered with provisions of this
kind.88 Many of these provisions offer tax incentives through
“deductions, credits, exclusions, exemptions, deferrals, and
preferential rates,”89 in order to incentivize certain conduct or
activity. For example, to encourage enrollment in higher education
and to help offset some of its increasing costs, the Tax Code provides
a modest deduction for certain tuition expenses.90 The Tax Code
also offers a modest tax credit for eligible businesses to conduct
research and development.91 Sometimes, the Tax Code imposes
unfavorable treatment (commonly called Pigouvian taxes after the
theorist who championed their use) to discourage people from
certain activities, such as smoking or excess fuel consumption.92
Although the substantive policy goals are quite diverse, all of these
“non-tax goal” provisions typically seek to incentivize activity or
conduct through the Tax Code by creating either more or less
favorable treatment under the Code. When the tax incentives cost
the government revenue (in terms of lost tax revenue), they are
called “tax expenditures.”93
Using the Tax Code as a method to address important societal
issues or initiatives has become a popular option for pursuing policy
and reform proposals. To address the epidemic problem of obesity in
the United States, proposals to tax junk food and soda have been
offered.94 To promote more environmentally responsible or “green”
technology and energy consumption, the Tax Code contains several

87. See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing
Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83
HARV. L. REV. 705, 707 (1970).
88. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 21-26 (2006) (various personal credits); id. §§ 27, 3030D (other credits); id. §§ 31-36A (refundable credits); id. §§ 38-45Q (business
related credits); id. § 54 (credit to holders of clean renewable energy bonds); id.
§ 54A-54F (qualified tax credit bonds); id. § 54AA (credit for Build America
bonds).
89. Surrey, supra note 87, at 706; see also id. at 713.
90. I.R.C. § 25A, 222 (2006); see also Bradley R. Palmer, Uncle Sam,
Tuition Costs, and the Changing Economy: Tax Incentives for Education
Expenses and How to Improve Them, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 345, 345 (2009).
91. I.R.C. § 41 (2006); see also Evan Wamsley, Note, The Definition of
Qualified Research Under the Section 41 Research and Development Tax Credit:
Its Impact on the Credit’s Effectiveness, 87 VA. L. REV. 165, 166 (2001).
92. See A. C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 192 (4th ed. 1932); W. Kip
Viscusi, The Governmental Composition of the Insurance Costs of Smoking, 42
J.L. & ECON. 575, 581–83 (1999).
93. See Surrey, supra note 87, at 706.
94. See Jeff Strnad, Conceptualizing the “Fat Tax”: The Role of Food Taxes
in Developed Economies, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1221, 1224–25 (2005).
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tax credits and incentives.95
The Obama Administration’s
controversial individual health care mandate attempts to fix the
problem of the lack of health care insurance for millions of people
and escalating health care costs by taxing individuals who choose
not to have health care coverage.96 Likewise, the preferential
treatment of long-term capital gains in the Tax Code—which are
taxed at a lower rate than ordinary income—is justified as a way to
encourage entrepreneurial investments and risk-taking that might
lead to innovation.97 The several tax benefits for homeowners are
justified as serving “important non-tax policy objectives such as
encouraging investment in commodity, enhancing the stability of
neighborhoods, and increasing the willingness of property owners to
fund local schools through property taxes.”98 In response to the
recent housing crisis, Congress amended the Tax Code to provide
tax credits for first-time and other homebuyers.99
Of course, some tax experts are skeptical about whether the Tax
Code is the proper forum for pursuing non-tax policy objectives. In
his seminal article, Stanley Surrey argued that direct government
expenditures to achieve a policy goal are preferable to indirect
expenditures through the Tax Code because “a resort to tax
incentives greatly decreases the ability of the Government to
maintain control over the management of its priorities,” while
complicating the Tax Code, reducing its overall transparency, and
possibly entrenching certain tax exemptions that have outlived their
usefulness.100 Surrey’s critique has generated a longstanding debate
over the desirability of non-tax policy uses of the Tax Code,101 a
debate that is likely to intensify as national debt reduction
continues to be a hot button issue. This Article does not attempt to

95. See Richard P. Manczak & Jeffrey D. Moss, “Green” Tax Incentives, 90
MICH. B. J. 27, 28–29 (2011); see, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 45, 48, 136, 168 (2006).
96. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1501(b), 124 Stat. 244
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A), amended by Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010); Florida
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1255–60 (11th Cir.
2011) (explaining the individual mandate in the Tax Code).
97. See Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504, 509 (1941) (citing H.R. Rep.
No. 67-350, at 8 (1921)) (justifying preferential rate for capital gains “as the
means of encouraging profit-taking sales of capital investments”); Noël B.
Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains Preference, 48
TAX L. REV. 319, 340–41 (1993).
98. John G. Steinkamp, A Case for Federal Transfer Taxation, 55 ARK. L.
REV. 1, 32 (2002). See generally Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 97
(discussing the arguments in favor of and opposing a lower tax rate for capital
gains versus ordinary income).
99. See The Homebuyer Assistance Improvement Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-198.
100. See Surrey, supra note 87, at 731–32.
101. For more on Surrey’s view, see STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX
REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES 30–31 (1973).
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resolve this debate but will offer a response in Part IV to some of the
concerns raised by tax expenditures. Suffice it to say, Congress has
frequently used the Tax Code to further important national
objectives. Using tax to further copyright objectives would not be an
anomaly.
B.

Current Uses of Tax Related to Copyrighted Works
1.

Federal Tax Code

For whatever reason, tax incentives have rarely been used for
copyright or other intellectual property objectives. Royalties from
copyrights are taxed as ordinary income at the general tax rates for
that income earner.102 The Code excludes copyrights from being
treated as a capital asset with its potential benefit of the lower
capital gains tax rate.103 Copyrights are essentially an afterthought
in the Tax Code, if a thought at all.
One small exception is the recent amendment in the Tax Code
that allows sales of copyrights of musical works to be taxed at the
preferential capital gains rate (currently fifteen percent104). In
2005, Congress created an exception for musical works that allows
songwriters to elect to receive the capital gains tax rate for sales of
The Nashville Songwriters Association
their compositions.105
lobbied for the capital gains treatment of sales of copyrights in
musical compositions, under a bill originally titled the Songwriters
Capital Gains Tax Equity Act.106 The Association argued that the
new law would bring equity to the treatment of songwriters
compared to music publishers who historically could invoke capital
The
gains treatment for sales of their copyrighted songs.107
Association also argued that the tax break could help save the
profession of songwriting given the losses allegedly caused by music
file sharing.108
102. I.R.C. § 61 (2006) (including royalties with gross income).
103. See id. § 1221(a)(3) (stating that capital asset does not include “a
copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition”).
104. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 10827, tit. III, sec. 301, § 301(a)(2), 117 Stat. 752, 758 (2002).
105. See I.R.C. § 1221(b)(3) (2006) (“At the election of the taxpayer,
paragraphs (1) and (3) of subsection (a) shall not apply to musical compositions
or copyrights in musical works sold or exchanged by a taxpayer described in
subsection (a)(3).”); Spencer Anastasio, Copyright Tax in the New Millennium,
ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Fall 2007, at 1, 24–25 (2007) (discussing the capital gains
rate tax exception for sold musical compositions or copyrights in musical
works).
106. See Capital Gains Tax Equity Act Becomes Law, NASHVILLE
SONGWRITERS
ASSOC.
INT’L
(May
11,
2006),
http://legislative.nashvillesongwriters.com/news.php?viewStory=49.
107. See Tax Cut Package Contains Breaks for Songwriters, BROADCAST
MUSIC, INC., (May 11, 2006), http://www.bmi.com/news/entry/334803.
108. See Capital Gains Tax Equity Act Becomes Law, supra note 106.
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The songwriter capital gains rate provides a poor example of
using tax to achieve copyright ends. The scope of the tax break is
quite limited. No other individual authors get the benefit of capital
(By contrast, all
gains treatment except for songwriters.109
patentees are eligible for the capital gains rate for the sale of their
patents.110) Moreover, the policy behind the songwriter capital
gains rate would appear to incentivize songwriters to sell their
copyrights to others, instead of retaining their works and earning
income through licensing. Congress could use tax law far more
comprehensively and sensibly to achieve copyright goals.
2.

State Tax Codes

The states have used their tax codes in ways that more directly
incentivize the creation of copyrighted works than has the federal
government. That is somewhat surprising, given that copyright law
for fixed works is exclusively governed by federal law.111 Most
states and Puerto Rico have special tax incentives to lure film
studios to create movies within their state borders.112 The primary
goal of these state tax incentives is to spur the state economies with
the money spent by film studios on location (e.g., food and lodging)
and with the added tourism and interest drawn to the area.113 Yet
an additional benefit is that the film industry receives, in effect, a
state subsidy to create a film in a particular state. With the savings
in expenses made possible by the tax breaks, some movie studios
can presumably afford to invest in the creation of other films. As
with most tax expenditures, however, the tax breaks for movies
remain controversial, especially as many states face budget crises in
the economic downturn.114
C.

The Theory of the Tax Fix for Copyright Law

The popularity of state tax incentives for film creation begs the
question whether Congress should consider making greater use of
tax incentives for copyrighted work under federal law. Anecdotal
evidence from the film industry suggests that movie studios are
highly responsive to tax incentives to locate a movie production
109. Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Equity and Efficiency in
Intellectual Property Taxation, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 25 (2010).
110. I.R.C. § 1235 (2006); Nguyen & Maine, supra note 109, at 14.
111. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006) (describing preemption of state law).
112. See Joshua R. Schonauer, Star Billing? Recasting State Tax Incentives
for the “Hollywood” Machine, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 381, 386 & n.29 (2010)
(discussing the benefits of low-cost destinations for film shoots); PRODUCERS
GUILD OF AMERICA, http://www.filmusa.org (displaying a chart of states with tax
incentives for movies) (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
113. Schonauer, supra note 112, at 387–91.
114. See, e.g., Alan Wirzbicki, Is the Massachusetts Film Tax Credit Worth
the Cost?, BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 14, 2011, 5:11 PM) http://www.boston.com
/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/blogs/the_angle/2011/01/film_tax_credit.html.
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within a state to obtain a tax break.115 Although the jury is still out
on whether the film tax incentives have succeeded in boosting state
economies, the evidence indicates that film studios have utilized the
tax breaks in various states.116 For example, New Mexico’s twentyfive percent tax refund for in-state movie production has reportedly
brought in an estimated $600 million from 2003 to 2008 based on
film productions of such high profile movies as No Country for Old
Men, Terminator Salvation, Indiana Jones and the Kingdom of the
Crystal Skull, and Transformers.117 Although these state tax
incentives for film production are not copyright reforms or efforts to
modernize copyright law, they do provide an example of how the tax
system can be used alongside copyright law. This Part explains why
Congress should go one step further and use tax incentives as a way
to achieve copyright goals.
D.

Innovating Copyright Law Within International Copyright
1.

Treaties

A major advantage of using the tax system to modernize
copyright law is the flexibility the tax system offers. By using the
Tax Code instead of the Copyright Act, Congress has the freedom to
consider a variety of copyright reforms that would not present any
problems under international treaties.
Neither the Berne
Convention nor the TRIPS Agreement speaks to, much less restricts,
the ability of countries to impose taxes or create tax incentives
related to copyrights.118
Moreover, the tax fix is better than the current way typically
used to get around the Berne Convention—that is, treating domestic

115. See, e.g., Michael Cieply, Jitters Are Setting In for States Giving Big
Incentives to Lure Film Producers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2008, at A26.
116. See id. (discussing films made in Louisiana, Rhode Island, New Mexico,
Michigan).
117. Schonauer, supra note 112, at 398–99; Cieply, supra note 115, at A26.
118. Although another WTO agreement does limit countries from using
taxes that constitute “export subsidies,” the limitation is narrowly defined to
subsidies that are “contingent . . . upon export performance.” Appellate Body
Report, United States—Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations, ¶ 3
WT/DS108/AB/RW (Jan. 14, 2002); Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (“SCM Agreement”), WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english
/tratop_e/scm_e/subs_e.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2012). None of the tax
incentives for copyright law contemplated by this Article would fall within this
definition of export subsidy. Moreover, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (“GATT”) does prohibit some tax measures that discriminate against
foreign goods (a violation of national treatment). See General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade art. III, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 188
[hereinafter GATT]; Alan C. Swan, NAFTA Chapter 11—”Direct Effect” and
Interpretive Method: Lessons from Methanex v. United States, 64 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 21, 63–64 (2009). The taxes proposed herein do not discriminate against
foreigners.
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and foreign works differently. Because the Berne Convention only
regulates works of foreign origin, countries can impose requirements
on domestic works that would otherwise violate Berne if applied to
foreign works.119 For example, the U.S. Copyright Act requires
registration as a precondition to bringing a copyright lawsuit for
“United States works”—meaning works first published in the United
States or, if unpublished, created by a U.S. national or resident.120
Foreign works have no registration requirement under U.S. law
because of Berne’s ban on formalities for foreign works.121 Likewise,
some recent proposals to shorten the term of copyright in the United
States adopt the same limitation to U.S. works, in order to avoid
Berne’s minimum standard of a term that lasts the life of the author
plus fifty years.122
The differential treatment of domestic versus foreign works has
several disadvantages. First, it complicates the Copyright Act by
having a two-track system: one for domestic works and another for
foreign works. Second, it has the effect of treating one’s own
nationals worse than foreigners—a form of reverse discrimination
that becomes less palatable as the disparities mount. In addition, it
may encourage strategic behavior among some copyright holders to
publish first their works abroad, so their works will be treated as
foreign works for the purposes of Berne.123 This strategic behavior
might result in “off-shoring” of U.S. jobs and publishing resources
for books, music, movies, and other works.
By contrast, the tax fix avoids these problems. A two-track
system is not created in the Copyright Act. There is no reverse
discrimination between nationals and foreigners. Each group would
be treated the same under both copyright and tax law. Without any
preferential treatment for foreign works under the law, the need for
strategic behavior and off-shoring of jobs and resources outside the
United States would be minimized.
2.

Incentivizing Greater Choices for Copyright Holders

Another advantage of the tax fix is that it will help to achieve
greater tailoring of copyrights to particular individuals, industries,
or circumstances. As Michael Carroll and others have shown, the
119. See Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 5 (“Authors shall enjoy, in
respect of works for which they are protected under this Convention, in
countries of the Union other than the country of origin, the rights which their
respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to their nationals, as well as the
rights specially granted by this Convention.”) (emphasis added).
120. See 17 U.S.C. § 411 (2006) (requiring registration for “United States
work”); id. § 101 (defining “United States work”).
121. See Berne Convention, supra note 4, art 5(1).
122. Id. art. 7(1); see, e.g., Sprigman, supra note 79, at 554 (discussing the
proposed Public Domain Enhancement Act, H.R. 2601, 108th Cong. (2003)).
123. See Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 5(4)(a) (stating that a work’s
country of origin is the country in which the work was first published).
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“one size fits all” model of our current copyright system (by which
most works are treated under the same general approach) is
inefficient: “In particular, this policy imposes uniformity cost on
society by failing to supply fine-grained rights tailored to the
economic circumstances of different classes of authors and
inventors.”124 For example, copyright law treats computer software
the same as a literary work, even though software is functional and
extremely short-lived in terms of its use.125 Likewise, small-time
authors who have no intention of commercially exploiting their
works and who may not even care about copyright, receive,
nonetheless, the same rights under copyright as those authors who
commercially exploit their works.126
Instead of the “one size fits all” approach under the Copyright
Act, tax law can give copyright holders a menu of options, with tax
incentives, for how they might tailor their copyrights to their own
particular circumstances. Thus, instead of Congress deciding how
best to tailor copyrights among copyright holders—a task that may
be fraught with error, given the huge amount of information
needed—each copyright holder, who arguably has the most
information related to the copyright in question, can decide whether
to elect from an assortment of self-tailoring options required for the
tax benefits. The tailoring by each copyright holder may lead to
greater efficiency. For example, instead of a ninety-five-year
copyright, software companies may opt for shorter terms of
copyright that correspond to the actual life span of software.
Although the Copyright Act already includes some modest tailoring
with respect to sound recordings, architectural works, useful
articles, and certain industry-specific exemptions,127 tax law can
provide even greater tailoring, individual taxpayer by individual
taxpayer. Presumably, each copyright holder is in a better position
than Congress to make the most efficient choice of how to tailor a
copyright to her own circumstances.
3.

Breaking the Political Stalemate Over Copyright Revision

A final reason Congress should consider a tax fix for copyright
law is that enacting a set of copyright tax breaks may be more
politically feasible than a major overhaul of the copyright system. If
history is a guide, we can expect any major overhaul of the copyright
system to provoke an intense battle among stakeholders. The
Copyright Act of 1976 took decades of study, hearings, and debate

124. See Carroll, supra note 63, at 1389 (emphasis omitted).
125. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§
2.04[C][2], 2.04[C][5] (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2011).
126. See id. § 5.01[A] (stating that copyright vests in the author at the time
of creation without qualification).
127. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 113–114, 118–120, 122 (2006).
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before Congress eventually reached an agreement.128 The tenor of
copyright debates today is even more divisive.129
By contrast, with completely voluntary options under the
proposed tax fix, copyright industries would have no reason to
object. The Copyright Act would remain the same, and many
copyright holders could benefit financially from the proposed tax
breaks. The tax fix has the potential of undoing the stalemate that
has plagued copyright debates in the past. Depending on the
proposal, Congress could justify the tax breaks for copyright holders
as a way to spur greater efficiency in the copyright system, as well
as greater innovation in the production and use of copyrighted
works.
III. PROPOSAL: THE COPYRIGHT GAINS TAX AND
COPYRIGHT TAX CREDIT
This Part outlines several proposals that use tax incentives to
further copyright reform objectives. Two types of tax provisions are
discussed: (1) a copyright gains tax and (2) a copyright tax credit.
A.

Copyright Registration as a Prerequisite to Tax Breaks

Before discussing the proposed copyright tax breaks, we should
discuss a prerequisite that would apply in either situation. In order
to obtain the copyright tax break, the copyright holder would be
required to register its work in the Copyright Office.130
This proposal would alleviate the growing orphan works
problem and incentivize the registration of copyrighted works. As
the Copyright Office recognized, the orphan works problem “is, in
some respects, a result of the omnibus revision to the Copyright Act
in 1976,” which eliminated “the requirement that a copyright owner
file a renewal registration in the 28th year of the term.”131 Under
the 1909 Act, the renewal registration precluded an orphan works
problem in two ways: (1) works that were not renewed in the
twenty-eighth year automatically forfeited their copyrights, and (2)
works that were renewed could be located (along with relevant

128. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, GENERAL GUIDE TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976,
at 1:1–1:3 (Sept. 1977), available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/guide-to
-copyright.pdf.
129. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COPYRIGHT ISSUES IN DIGITAL MEDIA, at
viii (Aug. 2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/57xx/doc5738/08-09
-Copyright.pdf (“Because of the growing number and diversity of interests with
a stake in the digital copyright debate, many observers believe that the
Congress may need to legislate a balance in copyright law between private
incentives and societal gains.”).
130. Private registries could be also used if the Copyright Act is revised to
include third-party registrations as some commentators have proposed. See
COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES PROJECT, supra note 45, at 24.
131. See ORPHAN WORKS REPORT, supra note 39, at 3.
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information about the copyright owners) in the Copyright Office
registry.132 Though renewal registration had been a feature of U.S.
copyright law since 1790, Congress eliminated it in 1976 so the
United States could join the Berne Convention.133 Joining Berne
was perceived as a way for the United States to assume “a more
prominent role in the international copyright community.”134 But,
as the Register of Copyrights Marybeth Peters conceded, “there is no
denying that [the changes in the Copyright Act of 1976] diminished
the public record of copyright ownership and made it more difficult
for the business of copyright to function.”135
The proposal addresses this problem by requiring copyright
registration as a precondition for obtaining any copyright tax break.
A copyright holder would have to register its work in order to be
eligible for the tax break. In order to create added incentive to
register the work early in the term of copyright, Congress could set a
time period for registration, such as within five years of creation of
the work. The five-year window might encourage the owners of
works that are not commercially exploited to register their works
anyway, in the hopes of one day monetizing their creations.
Copyright holders that fail to register within the first five years of
copyright would not be eligible to obtain a copyright tax break.
Having a uniform period for registrations of all works would make it
easier to educate the public on when registration would be required
to receive a tax break. The incentive to register copyrighted works
under the proposal might decrease the problem of orphan works by
encouraging more registrations of works over time than under the
current system.136 And it would do so without violating Berne’s
prohibition on formalities. In short, a voluntary registration to
receive a tax break is not a copyright formality.137

132. See 1909 Act § 23, supra note 16 (requiring renewal registration in the
twenty-eighth year of copyright).
133. See ORPHAN WORKS REPORT, supra note 39, at 3.
134. See id.
135. Register of Copyrights Marybeth Peters, The Importance of Orphan
Works
Legislation,
U.S.
COPYRIGHT
OFFICE
(Sept.
25,
2008),
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/.
136. The tax incentives would probably affect a much greater number of
works because many more works are commercially exploited than are ever
involved in a lawsuit (which requires registration as a precondition). See Lee,
supra note 21, at 1542–43.
137. Cf. 1 SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT
AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND §§ 6.107-6.108,
at 328–29 (2d ed. 2005) (noting that countries may use “carrots” to encourage
registration because Berne “merely bars making compliance [with registration]
mandatory for non-domestic works”).
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The Copyright Gains Tax

A preferential tax rate is one way to structure a tax incentive to
pursue copyright reform objectives. Similar to the capital gains tax
rate,138 the proposed “copyright gains” tax provides a lower tax rate
for income generated from copyrighted works, provided the
copyright holder satisfies whatever requirements set by the
copyright reform measure. I discuss below two different copyright
reform proposals: (1) shorter copyright terms and (2) mass licenses
of works to the public. These proposals are offered for illustrative
purposes; other copyright reforms can be substituted in their
place.139 The key takeaway is seeing how tax can facilitate a more
flexible approach to copyrights to achieve public ends—the
constitutional goal of the Copyright Clause.140
1.

Proposal 1: Opting for Shorter Copyright Terms

Assume Congress decides to pursue the objective of encouraging
shorter terms of copyright at the election of the copyright owner.141
This policy could yield three benefits. First, encouraging shorter
copyright terms might reduce the problem of orphan works. Older
copyrighted works, whose owners are more likely to have since died
or become defunct, are more susceptible to becoming orphan works.
Second, allowing copyright owners to choose their own copyright
terms avoids the inefficiencies of the current “one size fits all”
approach to copyright. Numerous works are not commercially
exploited at all, and some commercial works (such as software) are
exploited only for a few years. For these works, a copyright that
lasts the life of the author plus seventy years (or ninety-five years in
the case of works-made-for-hire) makes no economic sense. Third,
shorter terms of copyright can spur, much sooner, follow-on
creations and innovation based on works that have entered the
public domain.

138. See I.R.C. § 1(h) (2006).
139. It goes beyond the scope of this Article to justify or debate the merits of
the copyright reforms discussed. For the purposes of this Article, the merits of
a particular copyright reform are not essential to understanding the method of
using the Tax Code to further copyright objectives.
140. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991)
(“The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but
‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”).
141. An extensive debate over the (de)merits of lengthy copyright terms
followed the Supreme Court’s upholding of the constitutionality of the Sonny
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, which extended the terms of
copyrights by twenty more years. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222
(2003); see also GOWERS REVIEW, supra note 38, at 52 (discussing the estimated
economic effects of Eldred on the music industry); Marshall Leaffer, Life After
Eldred: The Supreme Court and the Future of Copyright, 30 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1597, 1599–1606 (2004) (discussing the Eldred decision and its
consequences for Article I, Congress, and the First Amendment).
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a. Basic Tax Structure
Instead of changing the copyright term itself in the Copyright
Act, Congress could enact a special tax break for copyright holders
who voluntarily shorten the length of their copyrights. Under our
current law, copyright holders always have the option of choosing to
abandon their copyrights or donate their works to the public
domain.142 Of course, few copyright holders ever do so because they
have very little incentive to donate their works to the public domain
under the current system. However, the tax fix for copyright terms
can provide that incentive by rewarding copyright holders who
choose shorter terms of copyrights by their own initiative.
Imagine one possible scenario. Congress enacts a tax break for
copyright holders who elect to give up some of their copyright terms
under the following graduated series of favorable tax rates on
royalties. Because the Copyright Act uses different metrics for
copyright terms depending on whether the author is an individual or
a corporation,143 two tax tables are provided.

142. See Nat’l Comics Publ’ns v. Fawcett Publ’ns, 191 F.2d 594, 597–98 (2d
Cir. 1951).
143. See generally Catherine L. Fisk, Authors at Work: The Origins of the
Work-for-Hire Doctrine, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (2003) (describing the
evolution of Congress’s treatment of corporate authorship under the “works
made for hire” exception to the Copyright Act); see also Cmty. for Creative NonViolence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989) (discussing the “works made for hire”
doctrine).

W03_LEE

2012]

4/2/2012 11:39 AM

COPYRIGHT, DEATH, AND TAXES

27

TABLE 1: COPYRIGHT GAINS TAX RATES FOR SHORTER TERMS
Corporate Author
Term of Copyright Chosen
Corporate Author elects a 1-year
copyright
Corporate Author elects a 5-year
copyright
Corporate Author elects a 50-year
copyright
Corporate Author elects a 70-year
copyright
Corporate Author keeps full term of
95 years

Copyright Gains Tax Rate
5% of standard rate applies
10% of standard rate applies
50% of standard rate applies
70% of standard rate applies
Standard rate applies

Individual Author
Term of Copyright Chosen
Individual Author elects a 1-year
copyright
Individual Author elects a 5-year
copyright
Individual Author elects life term
Individual Author elects a 50-year
copyright
Individual Author elects a 70-year
copyright
Individual Author keeps full term of
life plus 70 years

Copyright Gains Tax Rate
5% of standard rate applies
10% of standard rate applies
40% of standard rate applies
50% of standard rate applies
70% of standard rate applies
Standard rate applies

The proposed tax table attempts to treat individual and
corporate authors the same in terms of the tax benefit gained. The
one difference is that the copyright terms for individual authors are
defined by the life of the author plus seventy years, whereas
corporate authors have a fixed term of ninety-five years from
publication of the work (or 120 years from creation, whichever is
sooner). Thus, the tax table gives the option for the individual
author to elect to receive a copyright for a work only during her
lifetime. Of course, the number of years in the life of the author
varies according to when the work is created and when the author
dies.
Under the proposal, an author can elect a one-year term of
copyright and receive a tax rate of 5% of the standard tax rate for
royalties for the copyright holder’s income tax bracket. For example,
as depicted in Table 2, if an author falls within the highest tax
bracket of 35%, her copyright gains tax rate would be only 2% of
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income generated from the work.144 If the author elects a five-year
copyright, her copyright gains tax rate would be 4%. Electing a
copyright for the life of the author would receive a tax rate of 14%.
A fifty-year copyright would receive a tax rate of 18%, and a
seventy-year copyright would receive a tax rate of 25%. If the
copyright owner keeps the entire term of copyright, she would be
taxed at her normal rate of 35%. In each case, the copyright owner
decides whether to lower her term of copyright and receive a tax
break in return.
TABLE 2: COPYRIGHT GAINS TAX FOR AUTHOR FROM
HIGHEST TAX BRACKET OF 35%
Term of Copyright Chosen

Tax Rate on Royalties

Individual Author elects a 1-year copyright
Individual Author elects a 5-year copyright
Individual Author elects life term
Individual Author elects a 50 year copyright
Individual Author elects a 70 year copyright
Individual Author keeps full term of life
plus 70 years

2%
4%
14%
18%
25%
35%

The tax break afforded to the copyright holder would apply or
carryover for the remainder of the copyright term on the work in
question.145 Congress could amend the general tax rates, which
would affect the final copyright gains tax rate, but the discount
percentages would remain at five, ten, forty, fifty, and seventy
percent. Of course, the tax rates above are merely illustrative. The
amounts can be lowered or increased, depending how much
incentive Congress hoped to create. The vital point is that Congress
has considerable flexibility to incentivize copyright holders to
shorten their terms of copyright.
b. Advantages of Using Tax Instead of Copyright
The beauty of the tax fix is that it completely bypasses Berne.
First, Berne requires countries to recognize a copyright term of at
least the life of the author plus fifty years.146 Thus, if Congress
wanted to lower the copyright term to a shorter term for all works,
Berne would forbid it. A tax incentive, however, could help to

144. For simplicity, I have rounded all percentages in the tax rates to the
nearest whole number.
145. Alternatively, if Congress wanted to create a more limited tax benefit,
it could limit the preferential copyright gains tax rate to one year or a few
years.
146. Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 7(1).
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achieve the same goal of shortening copyright terms without
violating Berne.
Second, Berne establishes a default rule known as the “rule of
the shorter term.”147 It states: “[U]nless the legislation of that
country otherwise provides, the term shall not exceed the term fixed
in the country of origin of the work.”148 The rule means that
countries with terms longer than the life of the author plus fifty
years (e.g., the European Union has a term of life of the author plus
seventy years) can give a shorter term to a work whose country of
origin only provides for such shorter term. For example, before
Congress enacted the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
EU countries could give U.S. works the shorter term of life of the
author plus fifty years—that is, “the term fixed in the country of
origin of the work.”149 Even though the U.S. works in the European
Union receive copyrights from EU countries, those European
copyrights for the U.S. works received a copyright term shorter than
what EU works received.150 The shorter term puts pressure on
countries in the Berne Convention to raise their copyright terms
whenever one country raises its term above the rest. The United
States did exactly that when the European Union raised its
copyright term.151
The tax fix avoids the rule of the shorter term—and the
disadvantage imposed on nationals from a country with a shorter
term. Even if U.S. authors elect to give up part of their copyright
terms, the copyright term in the Copyright Act still remains the
same. Thus, the tax incentive for copyright holders to reduce their
own copyright terms would not alter, in any way, “the term fixed in
the country of origin of the work.”152 The United States could adopt
the tax fix, without disadvantaging U.S. works abroad, while
achieving shorter copyright terms through voluntary choice by
copyright holders.
c. Hypothetical Example: The Blair Witch Project
To illustrate how the copyright gains tax would operate in
practice, consider a hypothetical example using the independent
film, The Blair Witch Project. The small budget movie became a

147. Id. art. 7(8).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Lisa M. Brownlee, Recent Changes in the Duration of Copyright in the
United States and European Union: Procedure and Policy, 6 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 579, 614–15 (1996).
151. Michael Landau, Fitting United States Copyright Law into the
International Scheme: Foreign and Domestic Challenges to Recent Legislation,
23 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 847, 858–59 (2007).
152. Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 7(8) (emphasis added).
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surprise box-office mega-hit, earning over $140 million in 1999.153
The movie cost only $500,000 to $750,000 to make,154 so most of the
earnings constituted income subject to tax (assuming no clever
Hollywood accounting was used155).
The high amount of income generated from the movie would put
it at the highest tax rate. For simplicity, I will use the current 2011
tax rate of 35% in this hypothetical, instead of the 1999 tax rate.156
Assuming the high-end estimate of the production expenses of
$750,000, and applying the income forecast method of depreciation
under § 167(g) of the Tax Code,157 with an assumption that most of
the movie’s earnings occurred within the first ten years of the
movie’s distribution,158 most of the costs (let’s say $724,100) can be
deducted immediately.
The owner of the movie would have
$139,814,999 in income, subject to a 35% tax—or $48,935,250 in tax.
Under the proposal, the copyright owner of The Blair Witch
Project could elect to reduce its federal tax by agreeing to a shorter
copyright term. The options would be as follows:
TABLE 3: THE BLAIR WITCH PROJECT INCOME
UNDER COPYRIGHT GAINS TAX
Copyright Term
1-year copyright
5-year copyright
50-year copyright
70-year copyright

Tax Rate

Income Tax

Tax Savings

2%
4%
18%
25%

$2,796,300
$5,592,600
$25,166,700
$34,953,750

$46,138,950
$43,342,650
$23,768,550
$13,981,500

Although the copyright holder would have to exercise its
business judgment in deciding which tax incentive to select, the
copyright holder might prefer a five-year copyright over a one-year
copyright, or a fifty-year copyright over a seventy-year copyright.

153. See
The
Blair
Witch
Project,
BOX
OFFICE
MOJO,
http://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=blairwitchproject.htm (last updated
Oct. 27, 2011) (stating total domestic gross of $140,539,099).
154. See John Young, “The Blair Witch Project” 10 Years Later, ENT. WKLY.,
(July 9, 2009, 8:29 PM), http://popwatch.ew.com/2009/07/09/blair-witch/.
155. For more on the questionable accounting methods used by Hollywood
studios, see BILL DANIELS ET AL., MOVIE MONEY: UNDERSTANDING HOLLYWOOD’S
(CREATIVE) ACCOUNTING PRACTICES 10 (1998); Roman M. Silberfeld & Bernice
Conn, The Red and the Black, L.A. LAW., May 2011, at 36.
156. In 1999, the top corporate tax rate in the United States was forty
percent. See Chris Edwards, The U.S. Corporate Tax Rate and the Global
Economy, TAX AND BUDGET BULLETIN, No. 18, Sept. 2003, at 2, available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/tbb/tbb-0309-18.pdf. So, if I used forty percent instead
of thirty-five percent, the amount of taxes would be even higher.
157. See I.R.C. § 167(g) (2006).
158. I assumed the movie made only $5 million in profit in the nine years
following its release.
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The tax savings afforded by a one-year copyright over a five-year
copyright is only $2.79 million, while having four more years of
copyright would enable the copyright holder to make a derivative
work (e.g., a sequel) exclusively during that period. If the copyright
holder desired a copyright term longer than five years, a fifty-year
copyright might be preferred because it provides close to $10 million
in additional tax savings beyond a seventy-year copyright. The
present value of any income derived in years fifty-one through
seventy of the copyright term probably would not compare to the $10
million in extra tax savings now.
In terms of mechanics, the copyright holder would have to
register the copyright for The Blair Witch Project and also file notice
of its decision to abandon its copyright after the chosen number of
years. The public notice would be contained in the copyright
registration, all accessible online, similar to disclaimers in
trademark registration.
The example illustrates how tax incentives might induce
copyright holders to elect to have shorter terms of copyright,
perhaps even as short as five years or less. Although The Blair
Witch Project provides an extreme example of massive profits from a
work, it shows the attractiveness of a copyright gains tax. Of
course, the precise tax rates set for the copyright gains tax would
require further study and debate. The numbers above are meant for
heuristic purposes.
2.

Proposal 2: Opting for Licenses for Public Use of a Work

a. Basic Tax Structure
The copyright gains tax can also be used for other copyright
objectives.
Imagine Congress wanted to encourage copyright
holders to allow greater exploitation of their works, including in
derivative works. This initiative could spur greater follow-on
creations, earlier in the term of the copyright.159 Instead of having
to wait until the work enters the public domain, the public could
exploit the works in ways greater than allowed currently under
copyright law. A copyright gains tax would apply if a copyright
holder elected, within the first five years of copyright, to adopt a
free, mass license to allow the public to make derivative works for
the remainder of the copyright. The mass license could be a
Creative Commons license, which is a popular way for copyright

159. For more on how the derivative works right can retard follow-on
creations, see Christina Bohannan, Taming the Derivative Works Right: A
Modest Proposal for Reducing Overbreadth and Vagueness in Copyright, 12
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 669, 677–81 (2010); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright,
Derivative Works, and the Economics of Complements, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH.
L. 779, 782 (2010); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s
Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 53 (2002).
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holders to mass license their works.160 For example, the Creative
Commons-By license requires the follow-on user to provide
attribution to the original author in using the work.161 The election
period might be set at the first five years of copyright for a work, in
order to allow the public to use the work when it is recent and to
maximize the amount of time afforded to the public to utilize the
work in making new, derivative works.
The precise tax rates set would require further study and
debate. For illustrative purposes, the copyright gains tax for
allowing derivative works could be set as follows:
TABLE 4: COPYRIGHT GAINS TAX FOR COPYRIGHT
HOLDERS’ MASS LICENSES
Election By Copyright Holder

Copyright Gains Tax Rate

Author elects derivative work (“DW”)
mass license, including commercial
and noncommercial uses
Author elects DW mass license, only for
noncommercial uses

60% of standard rate applies
90% of standard rate applies

Thus, the copyright holder receives a ten percent discount on
the standard tax rate on income generated from a work for which it
has authorized a mass license to the public to make derivative
works only for noncommercial purposes. Similarly, a copyright
holder receives a forty percent discount on the standard tax rate on
income generated from a work for which it has authorized a mass
license on the public to make derivative works for both commercial
and noncommercial purposes. The greater discount is given to
allowing commercial derivative works, in part because those works
will possibly generate economic activity and further income subject
to tax. The added tax revenue could help offset the losses in tax
revenue created by the preferential copyright gains tax rate.
b. Advantages of Using Tax Instead of Copyright
As in the case of shorter copyright terms, the main advantage of
using the Tax Code here is that it achieves greater flexibility
without raising Berne Convention problems. Articles 12 and 14 of
Berne require countries to recognize a set of adaptation rights—
commonly known under the umbrella of the right to make derivative
works.162 Thus, the United States could not substantially diminish

160. See Michael W. Carroll, Creative Commons and the New Intermediaries,
2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 45, 47–48 (2006).
161. See About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org
/licenses/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2012).
162. See Berne Convention, supra note 4, arts. 12, 14.
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the right to make derivative works, at least not for foreign works,
without violating the Berne Convention. Moreover, the right to
make a derivative work arguably serves a useful purpose in
incentivizing authors to create not only a first work but also,
potentially, a derivative work. The copyright gains tax, however,
could make the derivative work right more flexible. The flexibility
could incentivize copyright holders to promote socially productive reuses of their works. For example, the growth of noncommercial fanfiction online—short stories created by third parties based on
famous works like Harry Potter—currently occupies an uncertain
status between possible infringement and fair use.163 One easy way
to clear up this uncertainty is to encourage authors themselves to
mass license their works.
c. Hypothetical Example: The Blair Witch Project
Let us return to the example of The Blair Witch Project.
Imagine the copyright holder grants the public a mass license to use
the movie in noncommercial derivative works, such as remix
videos.164 The mass license would be recorded in the Copyright
Office, along with the registration of the work. Copies of the work
could be required to indicate a mass license has been granted to the
public for reuse of the work (such as by the Creative Commons
symbols). As shown in Table 5 below, under the copyright gains tax
rate, the copyright holder would be taxed at 90% of the standard tax
rate that applies—meaning the rate would lower from the highest
tax rate of 35% to the discounted rate of 32%. Applying the
preferential rate would lower the tax from $48,935,250 to
$44,740,800, a decent savings of $4.2 million.
The copyright holder can obtain an even larger tax benefit of
60% of the standard rate by opting to allow commercial derivative
works as well. In such case, the tax rate would lower from 35% to
21%, with a tax of $29,389,500—which equals a tax savings of $19.6
million.
TABLE 5: THE BLAIR WITCH PROJECT INCOME
UNDER COPYRIGHT GAINS TAX
Mass Copyright
License
Noncommercial DWs
All DWs

Tax
Rate

Income
Tax

Tax
Savings

32%
21%

$44,740,800
$29,361,150

$4,194,350
$19,574,100

163. See Lee, supra note 21, at 1530–31.
164. Id. at 1508–09.
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In essence, through the tax expenditure of the copyright gains
tax, the government is investing in follow-on creations and
innovation from copyrighted works.
C.

Copyright Tax Credits
1.

Structure of Copyright Tax Credit

Another way to use the Tax Code to further copyright objectives
is through tax credits.165 Typically, a tax credit would provide a
smaller tax benefit than a preferential tax rate. Deductions reduce
one’s taxable income and thus translate into different amounts
depending on the taxpayer’s tax bracket; tax credits, however, offer
dollar-for-dollar amounts reducing one’s tax liability, irrespective of
tax bracket.166 A tax credit allows Congress to set fixed dollar
amounts for reducing one’s tax instead of having the tax benefit
fluctuate, such as in a tax rate, although the amount of the tax
credit could be made to change to different levels of income. For
example, the child tax credit is up to $1,000 for each qualifying child
under seventeen years old.167 Tax credits can also be made
refundable, meaning if the amount of tax owed by the taxpayer in a
given year is less than the amount of tax owed, the difference
between the credit and tax owed is refunded by the federal
government to the taxpayer.168 Alternatively, the tax credits can be
nonrefundable but subject to “carry over,” or used in following tax
year(s) when there is positive income.169
As in the case of the copyright gains tax, the proposed copyright
tax credits would be dependent on copyright registration of a work
by the same year the tax credit is sought. The next step would be
identifying a copyright objective worthy of a tax credit.
Imagine Congress wants to incentivize authors to allow more
free uses of their copyrighted works in schools, in order to encourage
learning with a greater diversity of materials and to help defray the
rising costs of education.170 A tax credit could be awarded to any
copyright holder for each school that requested and received
permission to use its work in the classroom for free. As shown in
Table 6, the tax credit might be set at, let’s say, $50 per school to
165. See generally Brian H. Jenn, The Case for Tax Credits, 61 TAX LAW. 549
(2008) (describing the benefit of tax credits over deductions and exclusions).
166. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Moss, Solar Panels, Tax Incentives, and Your House,
PROB. & PROP., Jan.–Feb. 2010, at 17, 18 (2010).
167. I.R.C. § 24 (2006).
168. Janet E. Milne, Environmental Taxation in the United States: The Long
View, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 417, 443 n.131 (2011).
169. See, e.g., Moss, supra note 166, at 20 (discussing carryover for North
Carolina renewable energy tax credit).
170. College tuition has risen, on average, over 136% during the past twenty
years. See Laura Meckler & Stephanie Banchero, U.S. News: Obama Plans to
Curb Tuition, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2012, at A3.
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which the author granted free use—including copying, public
performances, and adaptations—of part of a copyrighted work in the
classroom or at school, and $150 for each school granted free use of
an entire copyrighted work. The tax credit could be in addition to
any deduction allowed for donation of material to a charitable
institution,171 given that the donation here would encompass acts of
copying, performing, and adapting not measured within the amount
for donation of copies of works. A cap can also be set on the
maximum amount of copyright tax credits (e.g., $15,000) that a
taxpayer can claim each year.
TABLE 6: COPYRIGHT TAX CREDIT FOR
FREE EDUCATIONAL LICENSES
Free Educational License
Part of work licensed
Entirety of work licensed

2.

Tax Credit

Cap

$50 per school
$150 per school

$15,000 total
$15,000 total

Advantages of Using Tax Instead of Copyright Exemptions

Again, the main advantage of using the Tax Code instead of
copyright law is to provide greater flexibility to copyright in a way
that skirts any problems with international obligations. Instead of
creating broad copyright exemptions for schools that could be
subject to international challenge in the WTO, Congress could use
tax credits to promote the same objectives without raising any issue
of compliance with the Berne Convention or the TRIPS Agreement.
In addition, the proposed copyright tax credits have the added
benefit of promoting education and potentially helping to address
the escalating costs of education, including textbooks, which are
trending to an annual cost of $1,000 per college student.172

171. See I.R.C. § 170 (2006) (allowing tax deductions for contributions to
charitable institutions).
172. See NATSUKO HAYASHI NICHOLLS, SCHOLARLY PUBL’G OFFICE, UNIV. OF
MICH. LIBRARY, THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE RISING COSTS OF TEXTBOOKS 4–5
(2009), available at http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/78553; see also id. at 5
(“[B]etween December of 1986 and December of 2004, textbook prices have
increased at twice the rate of inflation, increasing by 186 percent, whereas
tuition and fees increased by 240 percent and overall price inflation grew by 72
percent. While increases in textbook prices have followed close behind tuition
increases, the estimated cost of textbooks and supplies for the average four-year
undergraduate student was $898 for the academic year 2003–2004, or about 26
percent of the cost of tuition and fees at four-year public institutions.”) (citation
omitted).
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a. Hypothetical Example: Open-Source Textbooks
To understand how the proposed copyright tax credit would
operate, imagine Author creates an “open source” digital textbook
free for others to use and copy. Twenty schools adopt the textbook
for use in their classrooms. The digital copies are disseminated for
free to the students in each school. As depicted in Table 7, Author is
able to receive a tax credit of $3,000 (20 times $150) for sharing her
entire textbook with twenty schools. To obtain the tax credits,
Author would have to register the copyright, keep proper records of
the names of the schools receiving the textbook (subject to audit),
and indicate, on the tax form, her election of the copyright tax
credits. If the same schools use Author’s textbook the following
year, Author would be entitled to the same tax credit.
TABLE 7: OPEN SOURCE TEXTBOOK WITH FREE EDUCATIONAL
LICENSE IN 20 SCHOOLS
Free Educational
License
Entirety of work licensed

Tax Credit

Schools

Total

$150 per school

20

$3,000

IV. ADDRESSING CONCERNS
This final Part addresses objections to the tax fix to copyright
law. Although the tax fix affords greater flexibility to copyright
initiatives without raising any international treaty concerns, it may
produce other side effects worth considering.
A.

Tax Concerns
1.

Tax Expenditures and Revenue Depletion

The biggest objection to the proposals above is their cost.
Congress must consider the costs and benefits of the proposals,
informed by analysis by economists and policymakers. To be sure,
the debt crisis and economic downturn in the United States pose
many challenges for U.S. fiscal policy.173 Some experts may
question the desirability of tax cuts when the economy is weak and
the federal government faces huge budget deficits.174 The issue is at
least debatable. In 2009, the Obama Administration cut taxes for

173. See Peter Coy, Why the Debt Crisis Is Even Worse Than You Think,
BUSINESSWEEK, (July 27, 2011, 11:05 PM), http://www.businessweek.com
/magazine/why-the-debt-crisis-is-even-worse-than-you-think-07272011.html.
174. See The Fallacy of Using Tax Cuts to Fix Recession, NPR (Feb. 16,
2009), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId
=100746977 (interview with David Cay Johnston).
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the middle class in an effort to stimulate the economy.175 In 2011,
Democrats and Republicans both were proposing different tax cuts
as a way to boost the economy.176 In any event, Congress will not
likely consider copyright reforms until later this decade, at a time
when the U.S. economy is (hopefully) better. Congress can always
adopt smaller tax breaks as a part of an incremental approach to
copyright reform. And, to the extent the current debate over
reforming the U.S. tax system will force Congress to make the tax
system more transparent and with fewer loopholes, the current
debate may pave the way for the kind of copyright reform proposed
herein. From an economic view, giving preferential tax rates in a
way that incentivizes the creation of more copyrighted works makes
sense, given how much the copyright industries contribute to U.S.
GDP and exports overseas.177
The proposed copyright tax reforms may not necessarily lead to
large tax expenditures over the long run. Stimulating the creation
of more works much sooner during the copyright term is one of the
primary goals of the proposed copyright gains tax. Copyright
holders are incentivized, with a preferential tax rate, to allow their
works to be used and adapted by many more people—including
commercially—much sooner than before. Instead of waiting ninetyfive years to see the mass public exploitation of works, now such
exploitation could occur in five years or less. The potential
proliferation of follow-on creations to existing, popular works could
generate significant income—itself subject to tax—that would not
have been created without the copyright gains tax incentive.
Indeed, one attractive feature of the copyright gains tax is that
the works that would cost the most in terms of tax expenditures
(meaning they generate the most income that is then subject to a
lower tax rate at the election of the copyright owner) would also
have the greatest potential of spurring commercial follow-on
creations that can generate even more income. The most popular
works commercially are likely to be the most attractive for people to
adapt and build on—and the most likely to lead to other incomegenerating derivative works. In other words, popularity can be
monetized—and then taxed.
175. See Heidi Przybyla & John McCormick, Poll: Americans Don’t Know
Economy Expanded with Tax Cuts, BLOOMBERG, (Oct. 29, 2010, 11:19 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-29/poll-shows-americans-don-t-know-e
conomy-expanded-with-tax-cuts.html (“The Obama administration has cut
taxes—largely for the middle class—by $240 billion since taking office . . . .”).
176. See Opinion, An Inferior Tax Cut: A Temporary Payroll Break Won’t
Help Growth or Hiring, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 2011, at A12 (discussing Democrat
payroll tax cut plan and Republican plan for tax cuts for individuals and
businesses).
177. See INT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP. ALLIANCE (IIPA), COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES
IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: THE 2003–2007 REPORT 5–7 (2009), available at
http://www.iipa.com/pdf/IIPASiwekReport2003-07.pdf.
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While many follow-on creations or derivative works would not
generate income subject to tax, it is likely that some would. In the
movie industry, Hollywood studios have routinely made large
revenues from adaptations of public domain works—including the
incredibly successful movies Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs
(which grossed nearly $185 million in 1937), Pinocchio ($84 million
in 1940), and Aladdin ($217 million in 1992).178 The proposal would
enhance the possibility of income generation from derivative works
because the underlying works would be more contemporary—which
enhances the marketability of follow-on creations. For example, a
sequel to Harry Potter, Twilight, or Glee would likely be more
marketable today than in the year 2081.
In addition, the copyright gains tax might attract new
entrants—meaning new creators—into content production, which
might in turn generate even more taxable income than would
otherwise have arisen. For example, the preferential copyright
gains tax might make it more economically feasible for “starving
artists” to make a living and pursue their passion as a profession.179
Among the new entrants to creative professions may be a few who
become the next J.K. Rowling or Justin Bieber, in terms of their
commercial success—again generating income subject to tax.
Even if the new entrants have only modest commercial success,
the number of new entrants in the so-called “long tail”180 may be
large enough to yield a decent source of additional income subject to
tax. Also, the added incentives to register copyrighted works may
lead to an increase in registrations. People who might not otherwise
register their works might be induced to register, in order to
preserve the possibility of a tax benefit. The fee for registration,
although modest, could generate more revenues for the government
in the long-term.181
The multiple ways in which new income streams might be
generated under the copyright gains tax are arguably less prone to
manipulation than under the capital gains tax. The majority of
capital gains are derived from sales of stocks, and of business and
rental real estate.182 Thus, the problem of “lock-in” occurs with
capital investments because investors may hold on to their stocks
178. Brief for Peter Decherney as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Golan v. Holder, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011) (No. 10-544), 2011 WL 2470832 app. A.
179. See Jane C. Ginsburg, The Author’s Place in the Future of Copyright, 45
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 381, 387–94 (2009) (arguing that the copyright system
should be designed in part to facilitate professional authors).
180. See generally CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL: WHY THE FUTURE OF
BUSINESS IS SELLING LESS OF MORE (2006).
181. The fee in 2011 is $50 for paper registration and $35 for electronic
registration. Registering a Work (FAQ), U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE (last modified
Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-register.html.
182. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 110TH CONG., TAX EXPENDITURES
390–91 (Comm. Print 2008).
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and other investments in order to avoid having to pay tax on gains
accrued from their sale.183 By contrast, the copyright gains tax
would probably not lead to a “lock-in” effect because most creators
probably have an incentive to share and market their works
commercially, instead of holding on to them.
The Blair Witch Project example shows how additional tax
revenues might be generated from the copyright gains tax.184
Imagine that the copyright owner of the movie opted for the fiveyear copyright, thereby saving $43.3 million from the preferential
rate of tax in 2011.
That $43.3 million represents the tax
expenditure the federal government made in enacting the copyright
gains tax as applied to the movie. The tax expenditure by the
federal government might be recovered in several ways.
First, the copyright owner might use part of the $43.3 million to
finance a sequel. The production of the sequel would very likely
pump money into local businesses where the film is produced. Even
if the sequel performed only one third as well as the first movie and
earned $46.2 million at the box office, the tax owed by the copyright
holder could be over $15 million, depending on how much the sequel
cost to produce. Second, the creation of other derivative works of
The Blair Witch Project—merchandise, video games, toys, and the
like—by the copyright owner or third parties could also generate
more income subject to tax. According to movie industry expert
Steven Gaydos, merchandising can generate between $50 and $200
million if the movie is popular.185 For example, in 2002, the Harry
Potter franchise generated $11.8 million simply based on sales of
Harry Potter cookies, candy, and gum.186 In total, Harry Potter
amassed a staggering $7 billion in merchandising sales and $1.5
billion in video game sales worldwide.187 Third, the financial
attractiveness of the copyright gains tax for The Blair Witch Project
might lure other creators to enter the field who might not otherwise
have pursued creative professions. To the extent those new entrants

183. See NONNA A. NATO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41480, RAISING THE TAX
RATES ON HIGH-INCOME TAXPAYERS: PROS AND CONS 17 (2010).
184. The Blair Witch Project is a rare example of a mega-blockbuster movie
that cost very little to produce so the amount of potential tax savings for the
movie may be larger than what would be typical in the “long tail” of creative
productions. See generally ANDERSON, supra note 180 (discussing how many,
smaller-income-generating works may produce substantial income in
aggregate). As an example of a potentially large tax savings, it provides a good
measuring stick to test the desirability of the copyright gains tax.
185. See Emma Clark, How Films Make Money, (Nov. 12, 2001), BBC NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1646640.stm.
186. See Allison Linn, Retailers Hope Harry Potter Proves Magical, MSNBC
(July
16,
2007),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19745297/ns/business
-us_business/t/retailers-hope-harry-potter-proves-magical/.
187. See Ethan Smith, Michelle Kung & Robert A. Guth, Potter Studio Tries
to Keep Profits from Going Poof!, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2011, at A1.
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produce taxable income from their copyrighted works, some of the
loss in tax revenue from copyright holders’ election of the copyright
gains tax would be further offset.
Thus, the copyright gains tax can spur a greater number of
creative works much sooner than under the current copyright
system, without necessarily causing huge tax expenditures for the
federal government. The income generated from the follow-on
creations would be taxed and help to offset the loss in tax revenue
from the preferential rate. Moreover, noncommercial follow-on
creations provide a social benefit or positive externalities in their
own right in a way that is not captured by income.
2.

Gaming the System and Tax Fraud

As with any tax provision, the proposed copyright gains tax and
copyright tax credit will be susceptible to clever attempts by some
taxpayers to game the system, if not commit outright tax fraud. For
example, in the past, some corporations have set up foreign
companies in order to minimize or avoid U.S. tax exposure—a
practice of expatriation that Congress attempted to discourage in
2004 by closing the tax loophole.188 Drafters of the copyright tax
breaks must vet the provisions and attempt to formulate them in a
way that minimizes the potential for similar gaming of the system.
But, as one court put it, “[e]ven the smartest drafters of legislation
and regulation cannot be expected to anticipate every device.”189
Accordingly, the IRS should monitor the implementation of the
copyright tax fixes to identify any gaming of the system, so Congress
might close any loopholes.
3.

Unequal Tax Treatment of Other IP

The proposal for copyright “tax fixes” begs the question whether
the Tax Code should be used in a similar way for the patent and
trademark systems. As Jeffrey Maine and Xuan-Thao Nguyen have
identified, principles of horizontal tax equity demand consideration
of treating the taxation of income generated from different
intellectual property alike, if they are truly similarly situated.190
However, some of the problems addressed by the proposed tax fixes
are idiosyncratic to copyright. The optional registration system,
lengthy terms, and problem of orphan works are not present in the
The potential benefits from
patent or trademark systems.191
188. See Michael S. Kirsch, The Congressional Response to Corporate
Expatriations: The Tension Between Symbols and Substance in the Taxation of
Multinational Corporations, 24 VA. TAX REV. 475, 505–07, 545 (2005); I.R.C. §
7874 (2006); see also id. §§ 951-65, 1291-98 (provisions governing tax treatment
of controlled foreign corporations and passive foreign investment companies).
189. ASA Investerings P’ship v. Comm’r, 201 F.3d 505, 513 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
190. Nguyen & Maine, supra note 109, at 14.
191. See ORPHAN WORKS REPORT, supra note 39, at 15.
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incentivizing greater uses of IP, though, are relevant to both
copyright and patent. A similar tax incentive for patent holders
authorizing mass licenses to create derivative inventions might also
be considered.
B.

Copyright Concerns

Some may object to the specific copyright reforms proposed,
particularly the incentives for shorter terms and more liberal
licenses for derivative works. Some copyright holders would argue
that they need a longer term and even more rights and enforcement
measures, given the ease of infringement on the Internet today. On
the flip side, some public interest advocates might criticize the
copyright gains tax proposals because the copyright gains tax does
not reward noncommercial productions. Each objection is discussed
in turn.
1.

Need for Stronger Copyright?

No doubt some copyright holders may desire longer terms of
copyright and even more rights. The history of copyright in the
United States has demonstrated that copyright industries have been
incredibly successful in obtaining expansions and extensions of
copyright over time.192
Whether or not these expansions and extensions should be
ratcheted even higher in the twenty-first century is a policy debate
that I do not undertake here. One attractive feature of the tax fix
proposal is that it leaves the current high levels of copyright
protection and long copyright term completely untouched. While the
Copyright Act remains the same, the Tax Code adds greater
incentives and flexibility to accommodate a diverse group of
copyright holders—some of whom may prefer maximalist copyright
protection, others of whom may prefer maximalist tax benefits.
Under the tax fix, the “one size fits all” approach of the Copyright
Act is modified, but only for those copyright holders who want to
modify it. In popular parlance, the tax fix is an “opt in” system.193
It is also important to bear in mind that the particular
copyright proposals offered above are meant as illustrations of how
the Tax Code can be used to facilitate copyright objectives. One
need not agree with the copyright proposals in order to see the
attractiveness of using the Tax Code to further copyright goals,
whatever they may be.

192. See, e.g., Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual
Property Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256.
193. See Marc H. Greenberg, Reason or Madness: A Defense of Copyright’s
Growing Pains, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 27 n.137 (2007).
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No Tax Help for Noncommercial Works?

Public interest advocates might criticize the tax proposals as
biased against amateur creators and noncommercial works.
Creators of noncommercial works are not able to benefit from a
preferential copyright gains tax rate. If no income is derived from a
work, there is no “gain” to tax.
The criticism is valid, but only to some extent.
Even
noncommercial creators can benefit from the copyright gains tax if it
is successful in inducing other copyright owners to allow their works
either to enter the public domain sooner or to be mass-licensed for
public use. The noncommercial creators benefit directly by having
more underlying material—both commercial and noncommercial
works—from which to draw. Moreover, under the copyright tax
credit for educational uses of copyrighted works, the author does not
need to generate income from her own works in order to benefit from
the tax credit. The tax credit applies whether or not the work has
generated income.
C.

Administrative Concerns
1.

Complicating the Tax Code and Copyright Act

Another objection to the tax fix to copyright law is that it would
further complicate the Tax Code and copyright law, both of which
are already complicated, if not incomprehensible, enough.194 Using
a tax fix—using tax law to further copyright objectives—would only
exacerbate the difficulty for the public to understand tax and
copyright. It may yield a “double whammy” in terms of complicating
both laws.
The criticism of complexity is valid. The tax fix to copyright law
will make things more complicated. Drafters of the tax fix should
strive to design a copyright gains tax and credit that will be easy to
understand. Also, the tax forms and schedules for the copyright
gains tax and tax credit should be written in a user-friendly format.
Just as with any change to the Tax Code or Copyright Act, programs
should be developed to educate the public about the changes. To the

194. See Lee, supra note 21, at 1539 (“This inherent uncertainty makes the
Copyright Act even worse than the Tax Code, which, despite its complexity,
provides millions of taxpayers at least with enough certainty for them to figure
out how much taxes to pay each year—even providing the public with the option
of electing the simpler, standard deduction.”); Michael J. Madison, Rewriting
Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391,
396 (2005) (“[T]he complexity of the copyright statute already compares
unfavorably to the tax code . . . .”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, UPDATE
ON REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP AND IMPROVING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 25
(2009); Tax Code Complexity: New Hope for Fresh Solutions: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Fin., 107th Cong. 39–40 (2001) (statement of Richard M. Lipton,
Chair, Section on Taxation, American Bar Association).
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extent that complexity is unavoidable, it may be a tradeoff for
making the Copyright Act more flexible for the twenty-first century.
The tradeoff may be worth making if the potential social benefit is
great, and the amount of complexity added is not too onerous for the
public to understand.
2.

Coordination of Tax and Copyright Components

One final objection is administrative: the tax fix will require
coordination between the Internal Revenue Service and Copyright
Office. Such interagency coordination may be difficult to achieve.
Yet the IRS is a relatively well-functioning agency in managing tax
filings of millions of U.S. residents each year.195 The Copyright
Office has not had as large an administrative responsibility as the
IRS, but the proposals do not require the Copyright Office to do
much more than overseeing the registration process—something it
has historically done. The key additional component would be
ensuring that taxpayers who invoke the copyright tax breaks have
registered their works and recorded the relevant information
concerning their copyrights (e.g., shorter term, mass licenses to the
public) in the Copyright Office. But this burden can be handled by a
requirement of disclosure of copyright registration on the tax form,
plus the penalty of perjury that governs tax forms.196 Successful
coordination among patent offices in the United States, Europe, and
Japan in sharing information and reviewing patent applications
under the Trilateral Review suggests that interagency coordination
between the IRS and Copyright Office would be feasible.197 If three
countries can coordinate their offices, then two agencies within the
United States should be able to coordinate as well.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. Copyright Act of 1976 is due for a major revision to
update copyright law and reduce the inefficiencies of the copyright
system. This Article proposes using the Tax Code as an alternative
way to reform or modernize copyright law. The main advantage of
this approach is that it allows Congress much greater flexibility for
reforms that do not implicate, much less violate, the international
obligations of the Berne Convention or TRIPS Agreement. The
approach also may be more efficient in allowing copyright holders to
tailor copyrights to their own situations and needs, instead of
imposing a “one size fits all” approach on all copyright holders.

195. See Statistics: Individual Tax, IRS TAX STATS (Apr. 18, 2011),
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=238634,00.html.
196. In addition, the IRS and Copyright Office can coordinate their
electronic databases to match up a tax filing to a registered copyrighted work.
197. See Significant Achievements, TRILATERAL, http://www.trilateral.net
/about/achievements.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).

